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Abstract: This essay discusses how medieval authors 
from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries dealt with a 
philosophical problem that social institutions pose for the 
Aristotelian dichotomy between natural and artificial enti-
ties. It is argued that marriage, political community, and 
language provided a particular challenge for the concep-
tion that things which are designed by human beings are 
artefacts. Medieval philosophers based their arguments 
for the naturalness of social institutions on the anthropo-
logical view that human beings are political animals by 
nature, but this strategy required rethinking the borderline 
between nature and art. The limits of nature were ex-
tended, as social institutions were considered to be natural 
even though they are in many ways similar to artificial 
products. 
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Introduction 
 
Aristotle famously claims that the political community 
(polis) is natural,1 but he also holds that its formal cause is 
the constitution, which is established by a lawgiver.2 
These two assertions are difficult to reconcile, not least 
because Aristotle also defends a strict dichotomy between 
natural and artificial entities.3 A natural entity has an in-
ternal principle of movement and change, and its efficient 
cause is the same form in another natural entity. For in-
stance, an acorn receives its form from the oak in which it 
grows, and its development into a full-grown tree is due 
to its own nature. Artefacts, on the other hand, are pro-
duced by an agent who has the form of the product in her 
mind, as when a builder constructs a house. From this 
perspective it seems that the two claims concerning the 
political community contradict each other : the political 
community is natural and comes to be by nature, but it is 
created by human activity and therefore artificial.4 
The aim of the present essay is to look at how medie-
val philosophers from the thirteenth and fourteenth centu-
ries addressed this philosophical problem. They did not 
question the naturalness of social institutions – such as the 
household, political community and language – but they 
extended the concept of ‘nature’ in order to reconcile it 
with the rather obvious fact that these institutions include 
conventional and artificial aspects.5 Their strategy was to 
put a strong emphasis on the anthropological side of Aris-
totle’s argumentation and base the naturalness of institu-
tions on the idea that human beings are political animals 
by nature.6 However, they also gave a central role to the 
freedom of the will and voluntary action, which shape so-
cial institutions and are necessary for their existence. Due 
to the twofold foundation of social institutions, it was 
necessary to challenge and overcome the radical dichot-
omy between art and nature, between human action and 
natural processes. 
I shall begin by analysing the concept of nature that 
medieval authors put forth in order to address the seem-
ingly conflicting passages in Aristotle’s Politics (section 
two). In addition to presenting the theoretical framework 
that was used in medieval discussions, I shall point out 
certain philosophical problems that arise from their views. 
Section three underlines the unity of the medieval ap-
proach by showing that exactly the same argumentative 
strategy was used in relation to the three social institu-
tions mentioned above : household, political community, 
and language. The central claim of the essay is that cer-
tain medieval authors took seriously the idea that social 
institutions are human creations, and they also recognised 
the challenge that this view poses to their naturalness. 
They extended the scope of the concept of nature pre-
cisely because social institutions proved difficult to ana-
lyse in terms of a strict dichotomy between nature and 
art.7 
The Scope of Nature: Inclination and Completion 
The tension in Aristotle’s view did not escape the atten-
tion of medieval philosophers. For instance, when an 
anonymous commentator (the so-called Anonymous of 
Vatican) asks, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Politics 
(written after 1295),8 whether the combination of man and 
woman is natural, he puts forth a quod non argument, 
which is based on a dichotomy between natural and vol-
untary institutions :  
Likewise, what is by choice is not natural ; but the combination 
of male and female exists by choice ; therefore etc. The major 
premise is clear, because it is one thing to exist by art and an-
other to exist by nature, because these two are distinct genera. 
The minor premise is clear, because the combination of man and 
woman is based on deliberation ; therefore etc. Also Averroes 
says, in book eight of the Physics, that the combination of man 
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and woman is not natural, since man projects the semen into the 
womb of woman by choice.9 
The argument itself is not original. As Marco Toste has 
shown, the idea that humans need to choose to form asso-
ciations was presented already by Thomas Aquinas and 
Peter of Auvergne (d. 1304), and accepted by several sub-
sequent authors.10 However, the force that the anonymous 
author gives to it reveals how important this line of 
thought became in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
He also establishes an explicit connection between volun-
tary choice and things that exist by art : when something 
is chosen, it stems at least partially from the human will, 
and therefore it is not natural but artificial.11 Thus, the 
whole question is framed from the very beginning in 
terms of a radical distinction between art/will and nature. 
The argument creates a dichotomous setting which sug-
gests that the association between man and woman can be 
either completely natural or completely artificial, and it 
aims at proving that it is not natural because it involves a 
choice.  
Anonymous of Vatican provides a good starting point 
for an analysis of medieval views concerning the role of 
human will behind the three mentioned social institutions. 
It shows that medieval authors were aware of the funda-
mental philosophical problem and did not hesitate to ap-
proach it in terms of a clear-cut division between natural 
substances and artefacts. Yet, they usually presented this 
division only to reject it by arguing that households, po-
litical communities, and language fall between these clear 
categories ; they can be considered natural even though 
they stem partially from human will and action. This ar-
gumentation applies principally to political and other 
communities if they are understood in an institutional 
sense ; the situation is different, if they are taken to be 
self-organising multitudes that are based solely on human 
needs. Aquinas discusses both of these, but he does not 
make an explicit difference between them. Certain later 
authors do, as we shall see below.12 In the following I 
shall focus on the institutional sense. 
The general strategy that medieval philosophers 
adopted in order to overcome the dichotomy between ar-
tefact and natural substance was rather simple : they sug-
gested that when Aristotle argues that social institutions 
are natural, he is using the term ‘natural’ in an extended 
sense, which does not exclude everything that is created 
by human beings. They concentrated on the anthropologi-
cal claim that human beings are political animals by na-
ture, which they reduced to an inclination to live with 
other people. The result was a distinction between two 
senses in which the term ‘natural’ can be used.13 A thing 
φ can be said to be natural if : 
(N1) φ is a result of a natural development ; or  
(N2) φ is based on a natural inclination.  
This distinction can be traced to Thomas Aquinas. He ar-
gues that the upward movement of fire is natural in the 
sense that it is necessary and caused completely by the 
nature of fire. By contrast, marriage, which forms the ba-
sis of the household, is natural in the sense that human 
beings have a natural inclination to it, but this inclination 
needs to be actualised by an act of will.14 Aquinas uses 
this distinction to support the idea that although the asso-
ciation between man and woman is a matter of choice, it 
can nevertheless be considered natural. In effect, he sug-
gests that the distinction between natural and artificial 
things is not clear-cut. There are things that humans es-
tablish by voluntary decisions but which nevertheless 
count as natural as opposed to artificial. 
 Aquinas does not use this distinction in his commen-
tary on the Politics, but he presents there another impor-
tant idea. Addressing Aristotle’s puzzling reference to a 
beneficent lawgiver, who first established political com-
munity, he writes : 
Then […] Aristotle treats of the foundation of the political 
community and infers from what has been said that all human 
beings have a natural drive for the association of the political 
community, just as they have for virtues. But as human beings 
acquire virtues by human activity, as Aristotle says in the second 
book of the Ethics, so human endeavour establishes political 
communities. And the one who first established a political 
community brought the greatest benefits to human beings.15 
As Toste has shown, Aquinas seems to have been the first 
to suggest this analogy between moral virtues and the 
drive towards a political life.16 He explains elsewhere that 
human beings have a natural aptitude to acquire virtues, 
but they are ultimately produced by and do not exist 
without human action.17 By comparing the political com-
munity to virtues, Aquinas suggests that it does not result 
from a natural process in the same way as an acorn devel-
ops into an oak. The emergence of a political community 
requires human action.  
The strength of this interpretation is that it manages 
to explain how the political community can be at the same 
time natural and established by human activity. However, 
it involves also certain problems. For starters, Aristotle 
does not say that virtues exist by nature. He claims that 
although they are not contrary to nature, they nevertheless 
do not exist by nature, precisely because they need to be 
brought about by human action.18 The potency to acquire 
virtues is natural for us, but we have to repeatedly per-
form virtuous deeds in order to actualise it. Virtue hinges 
on our voluntary control and this makes a radical differ-
ence to those potencies that are completely natural, such 
as the ability to see. Thus, although Aquinas may be able 
to show that the political community is not contrary to 
nature by drawing on Aristotle’s conception of virtue, his 
stronger claim concerning its naturalness does not seem to 
be justified. 
Another problem that stems from the suggested simi-
larity between virtues and the political community is that 
when human beings acquire virtues, they change as their 
natural potency to become virtuous is actualised. It is not 
clear where the potentiality, which the lawgiver actual-
ises, exists. The natural development of an oak is an actu-
alisation of a potency that inheres in the seed, and devel-
oping one’s virtues takes place by actualising a potency 
that the subject already has. However, it does not seem 
reasonable to say that human beings are actualising a po-
tency within themselves, when they decide to create a po-
litical community. We are potentially virtuous, but we are 
not potentially political communities, and the actualisa-
tion of a political community does not bring about any 
direct change in the person who establishes it, but creates 
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a new entity, as it were.19 From this perspective, the simi-
larity that Aquinas sees between political communities 
and human virtues appears problematic. Arguably, his ar-
gument fails to clarify in what sense the former differ 
from artefacts.  
These problems suggest another interpretation, ac-
cording to which simpler communities – households and 
villages – are in potentiality to turn into political commu-
nities, while lawgivers are efficient causes that actualise 
them. Aquinas seems to embrace this view when he ar-
gues that the political community is the nature of the 
household.20 It is not completely clear what the concept of 
‘nature’ means in this context, but it is likely that Aquinas 
is thinking of definitions that he gives in his commentar-
ies on Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics. The nature of 
a thing is an internal principle of development and the fi-
nal form that is actualised in this teleological process. Ac-
cording to this approach, natural substances are distinct 
from artificial things, because artefacts are brought into 
existence and completed by a human agent, whereas the 
development of natural substances is caused by an inter-
nal principle.21  
 It is not difficult to see that this interpretation loses 
much of the explanatory power of the analogy between 
moral virtues and political community. If the political 
community is truly natural, its development must be simi-
lar to the growth of an oak ; by contrast, if the lawgiver is 
an efficient cause, then it seems impossible to hold that 
the political community is natural. The tension between 
naturalness and the efficient causal role of the lawgiver 
seems insurmountable. 
 There is a third option, however. Political community 
can be considered natural in an extended sense, compara-
ble to a bird’s nest. A nest differs from natural substances 
because it is made by a bird and its existence cannot be 
accounted for by appealing to its own internal nature. It is 
also unlike virtues, since it is external to the bird, but it 
can be considered natural (instead of artificial), because it 
is based on the bird’s natural inclination to build nests.22 
This interpretation succeeds in reconciling the apparent 
conflict within the Aristotelian framework, but it has its 
own problems. For instance, it conflicts with the idea that 
human beings are constitutive parts of the political com-
munity and not external causal agents for it, like a bird is 
to the nest.23 More importantly, it runs the risk of diluting 
the difference between artefacts and natural entities. Al-
most everything that humans do stems from an innate and 
natural inclination for self-preservation. Why does a 
house count as an artefact, but political community does 
not, if both are means to achieve some natural goal ? Fi-
nally, all nests are alike just because they are natural,24 but 
social institutions contain cultural differences, some of 
which are consciously devised by lawgivers. There may 
be strategies to explain these problems away, but at least 
they call for a more detailed explanation of how exactly 
the extended sense of naturalness should be understood. 
Social institutions challenge the strict dichotomy be-
tween natural entities and artefacts, because strictly 
speaking they cannot be considered (1) natural in the nar-
row sense, (2) artificial, or (3) natural in the extended 
sense. Each of these options pose a different set of prob-
lems. Aquinas’ view is probably best understood as a ver-
sion of (3), but it is curious that he decided to compare the 
political community to virtues, instead of appealing to 
things that animals make on the basis of their natural in-
clinations. His general intention is nevertheless clear : he 
wanted to maintain that social institutions are natural, 
even though human beings establish them. To be more 
precise, they are natural in the sense (N2) : a thing φ is 
natural, if it is based on a natural inclination of the one 
who establishes it. Although Aquinas’ position does not 
manage to avoid completely the philosophical problems 
that he inherited from Aristotle, his solution makes room 
for human action as a crucial factor that partially accounts 
for the emergence of human communities. 
Thus, the idea that human beings are political animals 
by nature was used to account for the naturalness of social 
institutions. We should be careful, however, because the 
meaning of the notion of ‘political animal’ is not simple 
and unified. Medieval authors used it to refer to a cluster 
of properties and traits, and even though they generally 
accepted the idea that it is an inclination that is in need of 
actualisation, it is not always clear precisely what this in-
clination amounts to. One possibility is that it is an incli-
nation to live together with other people in order to ac-
quire the necessities for life.25 On the other hand, it may 
be understood in a more robust sense of having an incli-
nation to actualise one’s rational nature, which requires 
forming organised communities. Exercising moral virtues 
and rational thinking actualises this inclination, and if the 
political community means nothing else than a group of 
people who follow this kind of life, it can be said to be 
natural. Yet, insofar as establishing it involves a rational 
and volitional element, the justification of its naturalness 
by appealing to the inclination remains problematic – at 
least if one is not ready to discard the strict dichotomy 
between natural entities and artefacts. At least according 
to certain authors, the form of the political community is 
the constitution, which is devised by a lawgiver.26 Be-
stowing this form is a distinct process that may be based 
on an inclination (like the bird’s action to build a nest), 
but in order to hold that the resulting community is natu-
ral, one needs to find ways of stretching the distinction 
between natural entities and artefacts. Insofar as the 
community (or its form, the constitution) is devised by 
human reason, the problem remains. It may be less acute, 
if the inclination is taken in the robust sense, but the strict 
dichotomy between artefacts and natural entities is never-
theless difficult to apply to the community. 
Human Communities and Language 
Aquinas’ view gave rise to a general tendency to analyse 
social institutions in terms of human action and voluntary 
choice. The latter does not play any central role in Aris-
totle’s view. There is only one place in William of Moer-
beke’s translation of the Politics, where deliberate choice 
is mentioned in relation to human associations. Aristotle 
argues that the association between male and female is 
natural, because it is based on a desire to procreate, which 
is shared by all living beings :  
And so it is necessary first to combine those who cannot exist 
without each other, namely female and male for the sake of pro-
creation. And this happens not by choice, but like in other ani-
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mals and plants, <it is> natural to desire to leave behind some-
thing similar to oneself.27  
Aristotle argues that human beings do not choose this as-
sociation. It is natural because it stems from a desire to 
leave behind something similar to oneself. The same de-
sire explains also the behaviour of animals and the repro-
ductive functions of plants. 
Medieval philosophers were quick to turn Aristotle’s 
claim on its head. They did not reject it outright, since 
they were ready to accept the main thrust of the argument, 
namely, that the desire to procreate is natural for human 
beings just as it is for other natural substances. However, 
they argued that the relationship between a man and a 
woman is not natural for us in the same way as it is for 
other living beings : unlike animals and plants, human be-
ings can choose whether they form the association in the 
first place, with whom they form it, and how they organ-
ise it.28 This observation may appear rather trivial, but it is 
based on important philosophical ideas. In order to under-
stand what is at stake, let us shortly consider Aquinas’ 
take on the matter. He presents the following argument in 
order to prove that the association between man and 
woman, and by consequence the household, is natural :  
But Aristotle shows why this union [between a man and a 
woman] is first by what he adds : « not by choice. » We should 
consider here that human beings have something proper to them, 
namely, reason, by which it belongs to them to act by delibera-
tion and choice. And human beings also have something com-
mon to them and other things, and such is reproduction. There-
fore, the latter does not belong to them by their choice (ex elec-
tione), that is, by their reason choosing it, but belongs to them 
by an aspect common to them, other animals, and even plants. 
For all these things have a natural appetite to leave after them 
other things similar to themselves, so that reproduction specifi-
cally preserves what cannot be preserved the same numerically. 
Therefore, there is such a natural appetite even in all the other 
natural things that are corruptible.29 
Aquinas’ explanation is based on a distinction between 
rational powers, and abilities which are common for us 
and other living beings. The power to reproduce belongs 
to the latter group, because it is a vegetative function of 
the soul. Plants, animals, and human beings have a natural 
desire to leave behind something similar to themselves, 
and this desire functions as the basis of the association 
between man and woman. The crucial point in Aquinas’ 
argumentation is that we do not choose to have the power 
and the desire to reproduce, since they are natural for us.  
Given that this argument is part of Aquinas’ general 
proof for the naturalness of the household, we may ask 
whether it succeeds. He may be able to show that the 
power and desire to reproduce are natural in the sense that 
humans do not choose to have them, but does it really fol-
low that the association that is based on them is natural as 
well ? There is a tension between the claims that (1) cer-
tain anthropological features are natural, and (2) the insti-
tution that stems from these features is natural, and the 
move from one to another is legitimate only if we suppose 
that the concept of nature is taken in an extended sense. 
For instance, rational powers, which enable acting on the 
basis of deliberation and choice, are natural for human 
beings.30 Yet, things that are produced voluntarily and on 
the basis of rational deliberation are artificial rather than 
natural. Even if we accept Aquinas’ idea that everything 
that results from irrational powers counts as natural, the 
argument would require an additional premise that the as-
sociation between man and woman does not involve de-
liberation and choice at all. We have already seen that 
Aquinas defends the opposite view in his commentary on 
the Sentences, where he claims that marriage is partially 
based on choice, and therefore natural only in an extended 
sense.31 
Aquinas’ view opens a theoretical possibility to hold 
that although the desire to procreate is natural for us, we 
nevertheless choose the association that is based on it. 
This is exactly what later authors end up claiming. They 
argue that naturalness of marriage is based on a natural 
inclination to preserve one’s own life and leave behind 
something similar to oneself – that is, it is natural in the 
sense (N2) mentioned above – but at the same time they 
claim that it is voluntary at least in two ways : an individ-
ual human being chooses to enter marriage ; and the exact 
form of marriage is conventional and varies from one so-
ciety to another. The former aspect of voluntariness can 
be seen, for instance, in Peter of Auvergne’s question-
commentary on the Politics. He argues that even though 
the association between man and wife is natural, the in-
clination to form it needs to be actualised by voluntary 
choice.32 In a similar vein, Bartholomaeus of Bruges (d. 
1356) emphasises that although marriage is based on hu-
man nature, it requires mutual consent and free choice.33 
He also elaborates on the latter voluntary aspect : 
[…] although the combination of a man and woman is abso-
lutely speaking natural, as is clear from what has been said 
above, nevertheless to combine in a certain manner – for in-
stance, in the manner of Christians, Jews, or Saracens –, or in 
accordance to certain arrangements and customs, is voluntary 
and constituted by humans. Thus, various nations follow differ-
ent manners in their marriages, and the positive law deals with 
the combination of man and woman in this way, namely, insofar 
as it is subject to human will.34 
Bartholomaeus does not reject the idea that the union be-
tween man and woman is ultimately based on human na-
ture. It is a necessary means for natural aims of self-
preservation and reproduction and, as such, natural in the 
extended sense. However, marriage is also a social insti-
tution, which is voluntarily created by human beings. Its 
actual forms are conventional and depend on the laws and 
regulations of each society. In this sense, it is an artificial 
construction that receives its form from human action. 
The distinction between the inclination to form an asso-
ciation as such (absolute) and actualising this inclination 
by forming a certain kind of association (sic vel sic) 
shows that Bartholomaeus recognises that human institu-
tions, such as marriage, challenge the strict notion of na-
ture that excludes all artificial constructions. Still he is 
unwilling to grant that an association that is organised in a 
certain way is artificial, even if its organisation results 
from human reason and will.  
Practically the same idea was defended in relation to 
political communities, but there was one important differ-
ence : whereas each individual decides whether or not to 
enter marriage, most humans are born into already exist-
ing communities. This is probably one of the reasons why 
the first voluntary element – the one that pertains to the 
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relation between an individual and the political commu-
nity – was typically analysed in terms of the possibility to 
retreat to a solitary life, not as an active choice to partici-
pate in social life.35 For instance, Peter of Auvergne en-
dorses the Aristotelian dictum that human beings are po-
litical animals by nature but qualifies it immediately by 
arguing that it refers only to an inclination to live with 
other people. He employs the distinction between two 
senses of natural, (N1) and (N2), but instead of using it to 
explain the origins and naturalness of political communi-
ties, he focuses on the social and political nature of the 
human being and argues that political life is not necessary 
for every individual.36 
Peter’s theory has been analysed elsewhere, and there 
is no need to look at its details here.37 For the present pur-
poses, it suffices to know that his view entails the exis-
tence of individuals who choose to live in solitude instead 
of leading a social and political life. The voluntary ele-
ment appears most clearly when Peter explains how some 
people are able live a solitary life due to their well-
disposed bodies.38 That kind of person is : 
[…] most apt for speculation, not needing the society to his most 
principal operation and being able to live without it due to the 
moderation of bodily passions. And then he is disposed towards 
the body as towards an enemy, like Eustratius says, he has a he-
roic virtue, and he chooses (eliget) a solitary life in order to 
speculate the highest things. […] And thus they become unso-
cial. They do not need the city for their defence, since they do 
not care about their bodies ; nor for the needs of the body, be-
cause they are enemies thereof ; nor for good customs, because 
they have an excess of virtues by themselves, as has already 
been made clear – and the city does not have other functions 
(opera).39 
Let us focus on the idea that Peter mentions in the middle 
of the quotation. He argues that those who have a superior 
body, which enables them to distance themselves from it 
psychologically, choose a solitary life.40 This claim can be 
taken to point to two directions. First, it reveals how Peter 
conceptualises the relationship between an individual 
human being and the political community partially in 
terms of a choice. Virtuous philosophers and saints are 
capable of choosing to leave the communal life behind. 
Second, by claiming that the solitary life is a matter of 
choice, Peter emphasises that the bodily complexion does 
not determine the way of life : a philosopher may also 
choose otherwise and to continue to live with other peo-
ple. This interpretation finds support from Peter’s com-
mentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, where he claims that 
also philosophers, who dedicate their lives to contempla-
tion of theoretical matters, need other people in order to 
acquire the necessities of life. It is not altogether clear 
how these two portraits of a philosopher can be recon-
ciled. One option is to think that there are two kinds of 
philosophers (those who are not perfect enough to treat 
their bodies as enemies, and those who are), but Peter 
may also think that philosophers have two options. Either 
they go on to live as members of the community and ac-
quire the material necessities for life from there, or they 
leave it behind and lead a solitary life. 
It is important to note that Peter is not suggesting any 
kind of contractual picture of the origins of the political 
community. He explains human sociability by appealing 
to a voluntary element, but his idea is to emphasise the 
relation between individual human beings and an already 
existing community, not the emergence of the community 
as such. Several medieval philosophers, who argue that 
the political nature of human beings is nothing but an in-
clination, follow the same approach : they make room for 
a voluntary choice that goes against the natural inclina-
tion. In principle, they could have used the same argu-
ment to conclude that the political community as such is a 
voluntary association, but they tended to concentrate on 
the ability to choose a solitary life instead of choosing the 
social life. 
To the best of my knowledge, the idea that human be-
ings might need to actively choose to live as members of 
a political community was not explicitly raised before a 
late fourteenth century Parisian master of arts, Nicholas of 
Vaudémont (fl. 1370s), argued that : « Although human 
beings are political (civilis) by nature, they are not politi-
cal initially and by way of completion, but only initially 
[…] because human beings are in a political community 
(communicatione civili) by will and choice. »41 Human 
sociability is a matter of choice, and the ability to choose 
is attributed to everyone – including those who decide to 
take part in social life. The choice concerns a life within 
the community, not only a life in solitude.  
Unfortunately, Nicholas does not develop this sug-
gestion further, and it is difficult to know how serious it 
is. Given that most human beings are born into an existing 
community and could never survive to their adulthood 
without help from others,42 it seems clear that they do not 
need to make an active choice to live with others : it suf-
fices that they remain where they already are. Nicholas’ 
idea may have been that since people are free to choose a 
solitary life, they tacitly choose to live within as long as 
they remain in the community. Even so, the relation be-
tween an individual human being and the community is 
conceptualised in voluntary terms, while the political na-
ture of man is reduced to an inclination to live with oth-
ers.  
What about the other voluntary element, the idea that 
the existence and the final form of the political commu-
nity is a result of human choice, and by consequence (par-
tially) conventional and artificial ? It is well known that 
the idea of a pre-political state of humankind, from which 
the political community emerged by human action, was 
not alien to medieval philosophers. They were heavily 
influenced by Augustine’s conception of the political life 
as a result of original sin, and they knew Cicero’s story of 
the transition from the original state to a political commu-
nity, which was accomplished by rational and rhetorical 
means. John of Paris (1255–1306) and Marsilius of Padua 
(c. 1275–c. 1342) adapted central elements of the Cicero-
nian view in order to demonstrate that although human 
beings retained part of their original social nature after the 
fall, the actual creation of a political community is not 
entirely a natural process but requires human action.43 
These ideas obviously influenced the way Aristotle was 
read and interpreted in the Middle Ages, but the idea that 
the emergence of a political community requires human 
action was not always developed in relation to Cicero, 
and the reasons for emphasising voluntary decision were 
manifold.44 
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Giles of Rome argues along these lines that there are two 
ways in which a political community (city or kingdom) 
may emerge. The first way reflects Aristotle’s genetic ar-
gument, and the second is closer to the Ciceronian model, 
according to which people first lived a scattered life and 
later came together and decided to establish a community. 
Giles argues that in both cases the resulting community is 
natural, but he also emphasises that the first way is more 
natural than the second, because it is based on a natural 
inclination and the process is natural, as it takes place 
through reproduction. In the latter case, naturalness is 
only due to the original inclination, since the actual estab-
lishment of the community is a matter of rational choice.45 
Giles does not pay attention to the problem concerning 
the dichotomy between art and nature, and he does not 
use the distinction between the two senses of nature (N1 
and N2). However, the idea that naturalness comes in de-
grees suggests that he has some kind of extended sense of 
nature in mind. 
Another way to deal with the twofold origins of the 
political community appear, for instance, in an anony-
mous commentary on the Politics (the so-called Anony-
mous of Milan, written c. 1300).46 The author writes : 
It must be understood that political community (politia) <can be 
taken in two ways>. In the first way, as it is a certain order of 
citizens who are united together for the sake of self-sufficiency ; 
and this order is the formal aspect of political community. […] 
In another way, the political community can be taken as it is a 
multitude of citizens who are united together for the sake of self-
sufficiency and life ; and this is the material aspect of the politi-
cal community, since citizens are the material parts of the com-
munity. […] And it is granted further that the political commu-
nity (civitas) has complete and absolute existence from reason 
and art. It must be said that this is true, if the political commu-
nity (politia) is a certain order […] but if political community is 
taken as a multitude of citizens who are united for the sake of 
self-sufficiency, then it is not from art.47 
Here we see clearly how the two senses of political com-
munity are distinguished. Human beings gather naturally 
in order to acquire the necessities of life. This kind of as-
sociation is completely natural : it does not require ration-
ality or choice, and it is not an artificial or conventional 
creation. People simply begin to live and act together in 
order to survive. However, creating a political order in an 
institutional sense (presumably by setting up a constitu-
tion) is a rational act, and the constitution is an artificial 
form of the community. Given that constitutions vary 
from one community to another, it seems clear that they 
must be explained by appealing to human action and deci-
sion. In this latter sense, the political community is not 
completely natural, and it does not develop like a natural 
entity. The anonymous author’s view resembles Giles’ 
position, but there is an important difference : while Giles 
seems to imply that existing communities may have 
emerged in two ways, the Anonymous of Milan argues 
that all existing communities, which are political in the 
strict sense of the word, can be considered in two ways 
and involve both natural and artificial aspects. 
The common element in the aforementioned views is 
that they make room for human action and choice as a 
partial explanation for the emergence of the political 
community. Nicholas of Vaudémont defends the same 
view by arguing that all things can be considered either 
(1) from the point of view of their origin, or (2) from the 
point of view of the completion of their existence. This 
division enables a systematic classification of things that 
are natural and artificial in different respects. For in-
stance, plants are natural in both senses, because human 
action does not play any role in their development. Agri-
cultural products are artificial (ab arte) in the sense that 
their development is initiated by human action, but they 
are completed by nature – a farmer sows grain, but the 
growth is natural. Finally, bread and wine can be consid-
ered natural with respect to their origins, because the raw 
materials from which they are made, wheat and grapes, 
are natural. They are artificial only with respect to their 
completion.48  
It is not altogether clear whether the classification that 
Nicholas suggests to make can be carried out, since it in-
volves certain technical difficulties. For instance, not only 
the completion of bread but also its origins seem to be ar-
tificial rather than natural (a farmer sows grain and a 
baker bakes the bread), and yet the plant itself is com-
pletely natural. However, the underlying intention is 
clear. Nicholas approaches the question concerning the 
naturalness of the political community by contrasting 
natural with voluntary/artificial, and his strategy is to 
claim that in a certain sense the political community (un-
derstood as a multitude of human beings who are subject 
to same laws and ruler and who live together49) is both 
natural and artificial. It is like bread and wine, as it is ini-
tiated by nature but completed by art. It can be considered 
natural, because human beings are political animals by 
nature – that is, they have a natural inclination and desire 
to live together.50 Yet, « although political community is 
initially by nature, its complete existence comes from art 
and choice. »51 The human inclination to live together 
with other people is one of the efficient causes of the po-
litical community, but humans nevertheless must decide 
to establish one ; and when they do, establishing it is not 
against their nature.52 Nicholas’ argumentation concerning 
the political community incorporates a strong voluntarist 
element, and it is based on the philosophical principles 
presented by Peter of Auvergne, but he focuses on the na-
ture of the community, in addition to the relation between 
an individual and the community.  
Nicholas refuses to accept the dichotomy between art 
and nature, and considers the political community natural 
in the sense (N2). We can see this clearly from his answer 
to a quod non argument, according to which : « […] noth-
ing artificial is natural ; but any political community is 
artificial ; therefore etc. The consequence is clear and the 
major premise is known because artificial and natural are 
distinguished. »53 Nicholas answers that : « <this argu-
ment> argues well that this community or association is 
natural initially and not by way of completion, and this is 
clearly true. »54 
 Finally, the same argumentative strategy was ap-
plied to language.55 It was commonly accepted that lan-
guage is natural for human beings, but what this claim 
exactly meant is a complicated matter.56 On one hand, 
medieval authors thought that humankind originally pos-
sessed a natural language, which was given by God or in-
vented by Adam. It was natural in the sense that it 
grasped the true nature of the things, but it was later lost, 
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either due to original sin (Henry of Ghent) or because of 
the incident at the tower of Babel (Dante and many oth-
ers). On the other hand, medieval authors accepted the 
Aristotelian idea that despite the naturalness of speech, 
actual languages are conventional (ad placitum) and cre-
ated by human beings.57 This view was developed further 
by making the familiar distinction and suggesting that 
while human beings have a natural inclination to use lan-
guage to express their concepts, the final form that lan-
guage takes is not determined by human nature. In effect, 
medieval authors thought that language is natural in the 
same way as other social institutions are : it is based on a 
natural inclination and completed by reason and will.58 
The two alternative explanations for the diversity of 
languages found their way also into Nicholas of 
Vaudémont’s commentary on the Politics. However, 
Nicholas mentions the tower of Babel only in passing, 
while the philosophical argumentation is prominent 
throughout the question. He emphasises that actual lan-
guages are based on the human will : « It is argued as fol-
lows : voices are imposed to signify things voluntarily ; 
therefore etc. The consequence is evident, and the antece-
dent is proved, because voices have conventional mean-
ings (ad placitum). »59 Although this view turns out to be 
too simplistic for Nicholas, he accepts its core :  
The second proposition is that to speak in one or in another way, 
or to speak one or another language, is not natural for human 
beings. This is proved because if it were, then all humans would 
speak the same language. The consequence is false. And the 
consequence is proved, because what is natural for one individ-
ual of a certain species, it belongs to all individuals of that spe-
cies. Secondly, this is evident, because humans speak in a cer-
tain way due to learning and custom.60 
Although it is clear that languages are not natural, the ca-
pacity to speak is. Nicholas invokes the distinction be-
tween two senses of naturalness and claims that although 
human beings have a natural inclination to communicate 
with others, the realisation of this inclination in the form 
of actual languages is a matter of human activity.61 The 
argumentative strategy is the same as the one that was 
used to explain the exact sense in which other social insti-
tutions (marriage/household and political community) are 
natural. Languages are natural in the sense that they serve 
functions that are natural for human beings, but they can 
be also considered conventional and artificial, because the 
exact form of each language is ultimately based on the 
human will and action. 
Conclusion 
Medieval discussions concerning social institutions chal-
lenge the distinction between natural and artificial enti-
ties. Household, political community, and language were 
considered artificial and conventional in the sense that 
their existence depends on human action, but at the same 
time medieval philosophers were careful not to question 
their naturalness. On the contrary, they argued that they 
are natural insofar as their emergence can be traced back 
to the social and political nature of human beings. The 
anthropological view that human beings are political ani-
mals by nature provides the important link between social 
institutions and nature, but in a philosophically problem-
atic way. Accommodating artificial and conventional 
elements of social institutions to the general framework of 
Aristotelian political naturalism turned out to be possible 
only by stretching the framework a profound way, and 
thus creating several philosophically intriguing problems. 
Even though medieval authors emphasise that social 
institutions are human creations, they are still far from 
early modern social contract theories. The foregoing dis-
cussion suggests that the fundamental difference lays not 
so much in differing views concerning the nature of the 
social institutions, but in a different anthropological the-
ory. When the idea that human beings are political and 
social animals by nature is rejected, the naturalness of so-
cial institutions loses its last footing and they become 
completely artificial – the problematic tension within the 
Aristotelian framework can also be solved by discarding 
it. However, medieval philosophers do not take that step. 
Instead, they extend the concept of nature because other-
wise the natural origins of social institutions would be dif-
ficult to explain.62 
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Notes 
 
1 Aristotle presents four arguments to defend this claim. In the present 
context, two of them are especially important : the genetic argument that 
the polis develops from simpler communities, which are natural ; and 
the telic argument that the polis is the final cause of this development. 
See Pol. I.2, 1252a24-1253a1. These two arguments seem to be based 
on the idea that things, which exist by nature, have an internal source of 
motion or change. See, e.g., Phys. II.1 192b12-23. For discussion, see 
Trott 2014, p. 42-64; Miller 1995, p. 37-40; Keyt 1987, p. 59-60. 
2 Pol. II.12; III.1, 1274b32-41; III.3, 1276b1-11. Aristotle also places an 
emphasis on human rationality and the ability to use language as impor-
tant factors that explain the emergence of the political community. On 
the lawgiver as the efficient cause : Pol. I.2, 1253a30-1; III.6, 1278b8-
10; IV.1, 1289a15-18. 
3 Met. VII.7, 1032a11-b1; Met. XII.3, 1070a6-7; Met. XII.4, 1070b30-
33; Phys. II.7, 198a22-27. 
4 I do not intend to claim that Aristotle would not have recognised the 
problem, nor that he could not solve it. This question is beyond the 
scope of this paper. For my purposes, it is sufficient that it is not obvious 
how Aristotle conceived of the relation between nature and human ac-
tion in the case of the political community. The problem is clearly stated 
in Miller 1995, p. 27-30. Modern scholars have presented various solu-
tions : see, e.g., Miller 1995, p. 37–45; Kullmann 1991, p. 94-117; Keyt 
1987, p. 118-141. 
5 Medieval authors observed that social institutions take various forms in 
different societies, but they also were influenced by Cicero, who depicts 
the political community as a matter of human creation. See footnote 43 
below. 
6 Toste 2014, p. 113-188; Blažek 2007, esp. p. 315-332. 
7 This approach comes in certain respects close to a philosophical prob-
lem concerning the relation between artefacts and natural substances : 
are the three mentioned social institutions artefacts or substances ? For a 
recent contribution to the metaphysical discussion, which also gives a 
good overview on the status quaestionis, see Marmodoro, Page 2016, p. 
1-21. 
8 For discussion, see Flüeler, vol. 2, p. 85, 119-121; Toste 2014, p. 144, 
n. 74. 
9 Anonymous of Vatican, I.4, fol. 15rb : Item, quod est ab electione, non 
est naturale ; sed combinatio maris et femelle est ab electione ; ideo etc. 
Maior patet, quia aliud sit ab arte et a natura, quia sunt a genera 
distincta. Minor patet, quia combinatio viri et mulieris <est> ex 
consilio ; ideo etc. Hoc etiam dicit Averroes, octavo Physicorum, quod 
combinatio viri cum muliere non est naturalis, cum vir proiciat spermam 
in matricem mulieris ex electione. The reference is probably to Averroes 
1962, VIII.5, 388vb, where he comments on Phys. VIII.6, 258b35-
259a7. Averroes’ point is not the one that the anonymous author is sug-
gesting, since he discusses the causal chain, which leads to the prime 
mover. He does mention an example, however, according to which Plato 
generates Cicero voluntarily, because he wants to copulate with a par-
ticular woman. 
10 Toste 2014, p. 121-156. 
11 The author emphasises the role of the will instead of reason, but he 
also mentions deliberation, probably because choosing requires it. The 
way the argument connects art and will shows that artificial things need 
not be designed by human beings : things that are chosen count as artifi-
cial even when they are based on inclination. The ending of the passage 
suggests that the association is not marriage (as a social institution) but a 
realisation of a biological drive to reproduce—which counts as artificial 
insofar as it involves a voluntary element.  
12 These two ways to consider human communities have been discussed 
in the literature. For references, see footnote 25 below. Although Tho-
mas Aquinas emphasises the incompleteness of human beings and natu-
ral needs in his De regno (Thomas Aquinas 1979, 1.1, p. 449b-450a), he 
defends the institutional reading in certain passages of his commentary 
on the Politics. See Thomas Aquinas 1971a, 1.1/b, 79b : […] ciuitates 
sunt institute humana industria. Ille autem qui primo instituit ciuitatem 
fuit causa hominibus maximorum bonorum. Ibid., 2.17, 181a : Postquam 
Philosophus prosecutus est de diuersis politiis, hic prosequitur de 
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institutoribus politiarum et legum. […] quidam enim fuerunt conditores 
aliquarum legum sine hoc quod ordinarent aliquam politiam ; quidam 
uero etiam instituerunt politiam, que est ordinatio regiminis ciuitatis 
[…]. See also footnote 47 below. 
13 For a detailed discussion, see Toste 2014, esp. p. 129-130. 
14 Thomas Aquinas 1858, IV.26.1.1; Toste 2014, p. 129-130. Aquinas’ 
conception of inclination has been analysed, e.g., in Finnis 1998, p. 79-
102. 
15 Thomas Aquinas 1971a, p. 79b : Deinde […] agit de institutione 
ciuitatis, concludens ex premissis quod in omnibus hominibus inest 
quidam naturalis impetus ad communitatem ciuitatis, sicut et ad 
uirtutes ; set tamen sicut uirtutes acquiruntur per exercitium humanum, 
ut dicitur in II Ethicorum (EN 2.1, 1103a31-b2), ita ciuitates sunt 
institute humana industria. Ille autem qui primo instituit ciuitatem fuit 
causa hominibus maximorum bonorum. The translations of Aquinas’ 
commentary are taken from Thomas Aquinas 2007, although I have 
amended them occasionally. 
16 Toste 2014, p. 124-125.  
17 Thomas Aquinas 1969, p. 77a-b. 
18 EN II.1, 1103a17-26; Miller 1995, p. 44-45. 
19 Note that it is one thing to actualise one’s own inclination to lead a 
social life by becoming a member of a society, and quite another to 
bring about an institution by laying down a constitution. Aquinas’ view 
fares better when applied to the actualisation of an individual’s inclina-
tion than it does when applied to the existence of a community under-
stood in an institutional sense. 
20 Thomas Aquinas 1971a, p. 78a; Pol. I.2, 1252b31-34. 
21 Thomas Aquinas 1884, II.1.1; ibid., 2.8.13; Thomas Aquinas 1971b, 
VII.6. 
22 Miller 1995, 40-45. 
23 Pol. I.2, 1253a18-29. 
24 See, e.g, Thomas Aquinas 1961, II.82.2; ibid., II.85.7; Thomas 
Aquinas 1973, XXIV.1. 
25 Latin authors found the idea that acquiring the necessities for life is a 
crucial aspect in their political nature from Avicenna. See Avicenna 
1980, X.2, p. 531-532; Avicenna 1968, V.1, p. 69-70; Fioravanti 1999, 
p. 19; Lambertini 1990, p. 277-325; Rosier-Catach 2015, p. 232-233; 
Toste 2014, p. 149. 
26 See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas 1971a, III.2, p. 190b-191b; Albertus Ma-
gnus 1891, III.1, p. 208a : Politia autem est ordo quidam habitantiam 
civitatem: ordo autem ille determinatur lege […]. Medieval authors fol-
low here suggestions made by Aristotle, see, e.g., Pol. III.1, 1274b32-
41; ibid., 3, 1276b1-11; Miller 2017, section 2. 
27 Aristoteles Latinus, 1252a27-31, p. 71a (emphasis mine) : Necesse 
itaque primum combinare sine invicem non possibiles esse, puta 
feminam et masculum generationis gratia ; et hoc non ex electione, sed 
sicut in aliis animalibus et plantis naturale appetere quale ipsum tale 
derelinquere alterum. 
28 This point has been extensively discussed in Blažek 2007 p. 315-332. 
29 Thomas Aquinas 1971a, I.1/b, p. 73b : Set quare ista combinatio sit 
prima, ostendit per hoc quod subdit quod ‘non ex electione.’ Ubi 
considerandum est quod in homine est aliquid quod est proprium eius, 
scilicet ratio secundum quam ei competit quod et consilio et electione 
agat. Inuenitur etiam aliquid in homine quod est commune ei et aliis, et 
huiusmodi est generare ; hoc igitur non competit ei ex electione, id est 
secundum quod habet rationem eligentem, set competit ei secundum 
rationem communem sibi et animalibus et etiam plantis. Omnibus enim 
hiis inest naturalis appetitus ut post se derelinquat alterum tale quale 
ipsum est, ut sic per generationem conseruetur in specie quod idem 
numero conseruari non potest. Est quidem igitur huiusmodi naturalis 
appetitus etiam in omnibus aliis rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus.  
30 Aquinas explains elsewhere that electio is an act of the rational appe-
tite (a.k.a. the will), which concerns things to be done and is based on 
rational deliberation. Animals and children can be said to act voluntarily 
in a broad sense, since their actions originate in them, but they do not 
choose their acts, due to the lack of deliberation. See Thomas Aquinas 
1969, III.5, p. 132-133.  
31 See footnote 14 above. The reason for excluding this part of the argu-
ment in the commentary on the Politics may be related to a desire to 
remain faithful to Aristotle’s text, which claims that the association itself 
is not a matter of choice. 
32 For a detailed study, see Toste 2014, p. 121-156. For an overview on 
Peter of Auvergne, see Flüeler, Lanza, Toste 2015. 
33 Barholomaeus de Brugis, fol. 124ra; Blažek 2007, p. 327-328.  
34 Barholomaeus de Brugis, fol. 124ra : […] licet combinatio viri et 
uxoris absolute loquendo sit naturalis, ut patet ex dictis, tamen sic vel 
sic combinari, puta modo christianorum, iudeorum, uel saracenorum, 
uel tali ordinatione et sollempnitate uel alia, hoc est voluntarium et a 
 
 
constitutione humana. Unde alie et alie gentes habent alium et alium 
modum in nuptiis, et hoc modo tractat legis positiua de combinatione 
viri et mulieris, scilicet in quantum subditur voluntati humane. Blažek 
2007, p. 328, n. 44. 
35 The medieval idea that human beings are capable of living in solitude 
has been discussed in, e.g., Briguglia 2013, 367-384; Toste 2008, 173-
195. 
36 Peter of Auvergne, QPol., I.9, fol. 277ra; see also ibid., I.3, fol. 275rb. 
This work was written between 1274 and 1296, and it is extant in two 
manuscripts and one fragment (Toste 2014, p. 125, n. 32; Toste 2015, p. 
321-353, esp. n. 14; Flüeler 1992, vol. 1, p. 86-131; Flüeler 1992, vol. 2, 
p. 101-112). I have used only the MS preserved in Paris. 
37 Toste 2014, p. 125-142. 
38 The idea that the quality of the body explains the differences between 
bestial, godlike, and normal people was generally used to explain the 
effects that the original sin had on human nature. See Robert 2016, p. 
173-204.  
39 Peter of Auvergne, QPol., I.9, fol. 277rb (quoted from Toste 2014, p. 
139, n. 59) : Et propter hoc aptissimus erit ad speculandum, non 
indigens societate ad illam suam potissimam operationem, potens etiam 
illa carere propter moderamen passionum corporalium. Et ille tunc 
disponitur ad corpus sicut ad inimicum, sicut dicit Eustratius, et habebit 
virtutem heroicam et eliget vitam solitariam ad speculandum altissima 
[…] Et ideo illi fiunt inciviles : civitate enim non indigent nec ad 
defensionem, quia corpus non curant, nec ad necessitatem corporis, 
quia illius sunt inimici, nec propter consuetudines bonas, quia de se 
habent excessum virtutum, ut iam patuit. Nec plura sunt opera civitatis. 
40 Peter argues elsewhere that choosing (eligere) is an operation that 
belongs to human beings qua human beings. It is clear, therefore, that he 
has in mind an act of the will. See Peter of Auvergne, QEN, p. 33. 
41 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.4, fol. 5va : Licet homo sit civilis a 
natura, non est tamen civilis a natura initiative et completive, sed solum 
initiative […] quia homo fit a voluntate et electione in communicatione 
civili. I have emended the 1513 edition with readings from two manu-
scripts : Bibliothèque Nationale de France, NAL 1130, fol. 2r-219r (= P, 
fol. 14v); and Vatican, BAV Vat. lat. 2167, fol. 1ra-139vb (= V, fol. 
6va). For biographical information on Nicholas and on the MS tradition, 
see Flüeler 1992, vol. 1, p. 132-68; Courtenay 2004, p. 163-168. Nicho-
las’ conception of solitary life has been analysed in Toste 2014, p. 153-
158. 
42 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.3, fol. 4ra (P fol. 12r; V fol. 4vb-5ra). 
43 Nederman 1988, p. 3-29; Luscombe 1982, p. 757-770. See John of 
Paris 1969, c. 1, p. 75-78; Marsilius of Padua 1928, 2.22.15, p. 353. 
44 Rosier-Catach, 2015, p. 225-243; Toste 2014, p. 113-169.  
45 Giles of Rome 1607, III.1.6, p. 413-414. 
46 For discussion, see Flüeler 1992, vol. 2, p. 76, 112-119 ; Toste 2014, 
p. 132-133; ibid., p. 151-153. 
47 Anonymous of Milan, VII.4, fol. 54va-b : Est tamen intelligendum 
quod politia <potest dupliciter accipi>. Uno modo, ut est quidam ordo 
civium congregarum ad invicem ad per se sufficientiam, et hic est 
formale in politia […] Alio modo potest accipi politia ut est multitudo 
civium congregatorum ad invicem ad per se sufficientiam et vite. Et 
istud est materiale in politia : cives enim partes materiales sunt politie. 
[…] Et conceditur ultra, quod ‘civitas perfective et simpliciter habet 
esse a ratione et ab arte,’ dicendum est quod verum est accipiendo 
politiam ut est quidam ordo […] Sed accipiendo politiam ut est 
multitudo civium congregarum ad sufficientiam per se, sic politia non 
est ab arte. See also ibid., III.1, fol. 19ra. 
48 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, 1.3, fol. 4ra (P fol. 11v; V fol. 4vb) : 
Sexto notandum est quod aliqua sunt a natura initiative et completive, 
sicut patet de plantis. Secundo modo aliqua sunt ab arte initiative et a 
natura completive, ut patet de bladis. Tertio modo a natura initiative et 
ab arte completive, ut patet de vino et pane. Ex istis sequitur quod 
quando quaeritur utrum civitas sit a natura, potest intelligi tripliciter, 
scilicet : initiative et completive a natura ; secundo modo ab arte 
initiative et a natura completive. Tertio modo ab arte completive et a 
natura initiative.  
49 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.3, fol. 4vb-ra (P fol. 11v; V fol. 4va-
b). 
50 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.3, fol. 4ra (P fol. 11v; V fol. 4vb) : 
Secundo est notandum quod quando quaeritur ‘utrum civitas sit a 
natura’ et cetera, hoc est quaerere utrum homo appetitu naturali 
inclinetur ad communicationem civilem. 
51 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.3, fol. 4rb (P fol. 12r; V fol. 5ra) : 
Quinta conclusio : licet civitas sit a natura initiative, tamen ab arte et 
electione est completive. 
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52 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.3, fol. 4ra (P fol. 11v; V fol. 4vb). 
Nicholas comes close to Aristotle’s idea of naturalness of virtues : they 
are not contrary to human nature. See footnote 18 above. 
53 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.3, fol. 3vb (P fol. 11r; V fol. 4rb-va) : 
[…] nullum artificiale est naturale; sed quelibet civitas est artificialis; 
ergo et cetera. Patet consequentia et maior est nota quia artificiale et 
naturale distinguuntur. 
54 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.3, fol. 5ra (P fol. 13v; V fol. 6ra) : 
[…] arguunt bene quod ista communicatio seu coniugatio est naturalis 
initiative et completive non, et hoc est bene verum. The Anonymous of 
Milan uses the same strategy in relation to marriage (Anonymous of 
Milan, I.4, fol. 2vb). 
55 The purpose of language in the discussions concerning the political 
and social nature of human beings has been analysed in Rosier-Catach 
2015, see esp. p. 227-237. 
56 The details of medieval views cannot be addressed to in the present 
context, but they are extensively studied, e.g, in Rosier-Catach 2016,    
p. 63-86; Rosier-Catach 2004, p. 35-98. 
57 The expression ad placitum may mean either conventional (collective 
connotation) or voluntary (individual connotation). See Rosier-Catach 
2011, s.v. ad placitum. In this context I use ‘conventional’ to signify the 
non-natural aspect of actual languages, regardless of whether the mean-
ings of words are voluntarily imposed by an individual speaker, or 
commonly agreed upon by the linguistic community. Aristotle thinks 
that speech is natural, but he suggests that it is not natural in the same 
way as voices are for animals. People speak different languages in dif-
ferent places, and the ability to speak a certain language is learnt and 
acquired through instruction. See, e.g., GA V.7, 786b20-21; HA IV.9, 
536b9-21; Miller 1995, p. 44. 
58 Toste 2014, p. 133. 
59 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.4, fol. 5va (P fol. 15r; V fol. 6vb) : 
Secundo arguitur sic : voces imponuntur ad significandum voluntarie ; 
igitur et cetera. Patet consequentia et antecedens probatur, quoniam 
voces significant ad placitum. 
60 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.4, fol. 5vb (P fol. 15v; V fol. 7ra) : 
Secunda propositio : taliter vel taliter loqui seu in tali vel tali idiomate 
non inest homini a natura. Probatur, quia si sic, tunc omnes homines 
idiomate uno loquerentur. Consequens est falsum. Et probatur 
consequentia, quia quicquid inest a natura uni individuo alicuius 
speciei, inest cuilibet individuo illius speciei. Secundo apparet, quia 
taliter loquuntur homines per doctrinam et consuetudinem. 
61 Nicholas of Vaudémont 1969, I.4, fol. 5vb (P fol. 15v; V fol. 6vb) : 
Secundo sciendum quod refert multum querere utrum loquela insit 
homini a natura, vel utrum taliter loqui insit homini a natura. Tertio 
notandum quod loquelam inesse homini a natura potest intelligi 
dupliciter : uno modo initiative solum, alio modo initiative et com-
pletive. Ibid., fol. 5vb (P fol. 15v; V fol. 7ra) : Quando dicitur quod 
« loquela inest et cetera, » verum est talis loquela vel taliter loqui. Sed 
tamen loquela inest a natura. Ad secundam respondetur quod bene 
arguit quod taliter loqui non inest a natura nisi initiative. 
62 This research was funded by the Academy of Finland and Stiftelsen 
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond. I would like to express my gratitude to 
Timothy Riggs for language editing. 
